A mouse in my kitchen

International week. Pole Universitaire Leonard de Vinci.

2012-02-16T20:03:00.004+02:00

Ecole de Management Leonard de Vinci. Paris.
International Week 19-23 March 2012
Course "Creative class, urban density, innovation and economic growth"

Information:

The students enroled in my course should read previously some papers. The papers will be included in my blog by February 26th. The students should take a test (the last day of the course). The test may contain questions related to the papers.

(Room and time in the attached programme)

A bientot. Fins aviat.Hasta pronto. See you soon. Iki :)

Leonardo Da Vinci IWschedule-EMLV-2012

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION SPRING SEMESTER 2012

2012-01-17T11:19:00.037+02:00

INFORMATION (updated 2012-02-19):

Dear students

In included already the third paper. You should read it and explain with your own words the main ideas of the paper. Dead-line next WEDNESDAY 22th.

- - - - - - - - -

I inform you that I have already included the second paper "Adjustment within the euro. The difficult case of Portugal" by Olivier Blanchard. You should write an essay explaining with your own words the main ideas of the paper . I remind you that on TUESDAY 14th 2012 you will have a second test (How the European Union works). The document has been already included in the blog. The tests will consist in a set of multiple choice questions. I remind you that according to the syllabus "the purpose of the quizzes is to help you to consolidate your understanding of course concepts and to measure that understanding". Quizzes will represent 5% of your grade.

Also I remind you that the readings and homework will represent 10% of your grade. Readings and homework have to be printed by the students.

I inform you that ON TUESDAY 7th you will have lecture and on WEDNESDAY 8th the lecture will be cancelled due to the teacher's trip to Germany. We will schedule other day for this missed lectures.

Kind regards.

Syllabus (distributed 2012-01-10)

I recommend you to visit Professor Wyplosz website

S L I D E S:

Introduction (Slides 1)
Introduction (Slides 2)
EU law, Institutions and Budget (test 2012-01-31)

PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS:

Paper 1. Ch. Wyplosz: European Monetary Union, dark side (dead line 2012-01-25)
Paper 2. O. Blanchard: Portugal (dead-line 2012-02-07)
Paper 3. Baldwin. Constitutional Treaty (dead-line 2012-02-22) (NEW NAUJAS)

Enlargement (test 2012-01-31)

How the European Union works (test 2012-02-14th)

VDU ISPANŲ KALBA. Level 1, 2, 3, 4

2011-09-04T12:03:00.317+03:00

El Sr. Sugihara atiende todas las lecciones y controla vuestra asistencia!

Information

Spring Semester 2012!!! Just started!!!! Please, 2nd Level students print FIRST SET OF EXERCISES.

4th Level students: I have distributed two dossiers (number 1 and 2). The dossiers also can be found in my blog.

4th level students: lectures will be on monday, tuesdays and thursdays from 9:45 till 10:45
ROOM 302. Gedimino 44

PRUEBAS ESCRITAS (TESTS)

Level 2 and Level 4 students.

Days (if anything change)

FEBRUARY 28th (tuesday)

MARCH 8th (thursday)

APRIL 12th (thursday)

APRIL 26th (thursday)

Information (contents) here

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALL SEMESTER 2011

Dear students the results finally are here!!!!!!

Final exam and final results Fall Semester 2011 (updated 6-I-2012)
Darbo Semestro Metu Fall Semester 2011 (results) (updated 6-I-2012)
- - - - - - - -

Information Final Exam. Level 1.
Information Final Exam.Level 2.
Information Final Exam. Level 3.

---------------------

Information (MIDTERM EXAM) October 27th 2011:
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Ispanų kalba (3 lygis-B1) ISK0313

I, II, IV, V 8.00-8.45;

302 GED 44

Ispanų kalba (2 lygis-A2) ISK0312

I, II, IV, V 9.00-9.45;

302 GED 44

Ispanų kalba (1 lygis-A1) ISK0311

I, II, IV, V 10.00-10.45;

302 GED 44

L E V E L 1: (Fall 2011)

EJERCICIOS:
Ejercicios 1. Septiembre 2011
Ejercicios 2. Septiembre 2011
Ejercicios 3. Septiembre 2011
Ejercicios 4. Octubre 2011
Ejercicios 5. Octubre 2011
Ejercicios 6. Noviembre 2011

OTRO MATERIAL DIDÁCTICO:
Diccionario/ Ispanų Žodynas (1 & 2 Level)
Examen parcial Level 1. Primavera 2011
3 Sardinas (song)

I N F O R M A C I Ó N :

PRUEBAS ESCRITAS (TESTS):
(Jueves,ketvirtadienis): 22 Septiembre, 13 Octubre, 10 Noviembre, 24 Noviembre.
Información: Aquí

Soluciones Test 1 (22 Septiembre)

Soluciones Test 2 (13 Octubre)
Soluciones Test 3 (10 Noviembre)
Soluciones Test 4 (24 Noviembre)
Soluciones Examen Parcial/Mid-term Exam (27 Octubre)

L EVEL 2 (SPRING SEMESTER 2012)

EJERCICIOS:
Ejercicios 1. February 2012
Ejercicios 2. February 2012
Ejercicios 3. March 2012
Ejercicios 4. March 2012
Ejercicios 5. April 2012

OTRO MATERIAL DIDÁCTICO:
Diccionario/ Ispanų Žodynas (1 & 2 Level)
Lentele ( Lista de verbos irregulares)
Bolero ("Contigo aprendí", canción del gran Armando Manzanero):
puedes escuchar la canción en You Tube aquí, aquí y aquí (con Luís Miguel)
Examen Parcial. Level 2. Primavera 2011

I N F O R M A C I Ó N (Nivel 2, Antras Lygis) :

PRUEBAS ESCRITAS (TESTS):
(Jueves, Ketvirtadienis): 22 Septiembre, 13 Octubre, 10 Noviembre, 24 Noviembre.
Información: Aquí

Soluciones Test 1 (22 Septiembre)

Soluciones Test 2 (13 Octubre)
Soluciones Test 3 (10 Noviembre)
Soluciones Test 4 (24 Noviembre)
Soluciones Examen Parcial /Mid-term Exam (27 Octubre)

L E V E L 3 : (Fall 2011)

EJERCICIOS:
Ejercicios 1. Septiembre 2011
Ejercicios 2. Septiembre 2011
Ejercicios 3. Septiembre 2011
Ejercicios 4. Noviembre 2011

OTRO MATERIAL DIDÁCTICO:
Dosier pedagógico número 1 (octubre 2011) (ser, estar, preposiciones EN ,POR, SOBRE, expresiones con Ser y Estar)
Dosier pedagógico número 2 (octubre 2011) (uso de preposiciones)
Dosier pedagógico número 3 (octubre 2011) (subjuntivo, derivación, condicional, consejos)
Lentele ( Lista de verbos irregulares)
Examen Parcial. Level 3. Otoño 2010.

I N F O R M A C I Ó N (Nivel 3, Trečias Lygis):

PRUEBAS ESCRITAS (TESTS):
(Jueves, Ketvirtadienis): 22 Septiembre, 13 Octubre, 10 Noviembre, 24 de Noviembre.
Información: Aquí

Soluciones Test 1 (22 Septiembre)

Soluciones Test 2 (13 Octubre)
Soluciones Test 3 (10 Noviembre)
Soluciones Test 4 (24 Noviembre)
Soluciones Examen Parcial/Mid-term Exam (27 Octubre)

Presentaciones orales (nivel 3)
México, Las telenovelas, La Salsa, Nuestras películas favoritas,Los cantantes más conocidos,La cerveza lituana, Navidad en Europa,España en Eurovisión, Animación, El barroco español, La música española y latina

LEVEL 4: (SPRING SEMESTER)

EJERCICIOS:

OTRO MATERIAL DIDACTICO:

DOSIER 1 (Febrero 2012)
DOSIER 2 (Febrero 2010)

I N F O R M A C I Ó N (Nivel 4, 4 Lygis):

SETS GRAMATICALES Y OTRO MATERIAL RECOMENDADO (TODOS LOS NIVELES):

"Aula Internacional- Curso de Español" Editorial Difusión. Barcelona 2008.
Set Gramatical 1. (Recommended to Level 1,2 students)
Set Gramatical 2. (Recommended to Level 1,2,3 students)
Set Gramatical 3. (Recommended to Level 2,3,4 students)
Set Gramatical 4. (Recommended to Level 3,4 students)
Diccionario 1000 thousand most used Spanish words (Recommended to Level 1,2 students)

EXERCISES AND READINGS (SPECIAL SATURDAYS)
Level 1
Level 2, 3
Level 3

Spanish Cultural Week. From 9th to 13th MAY 2011. Kaunas (Lithuania).

2011-04-28T14:44:00.001+03:00

Ispanu Kulturos Savaite Kaune

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ISPANU KULTUROS SAVAITE KAUNE (2011 geguzes 9-13 d.)

2011-04-28T14:42:00.000+03:00

Spanishprograma%20lietuviskai[1]

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Dime! Flamenco en VDU

2010-11-24T11:58:00.003+02:00

Arriba y abajo!! Lithuanian students and "Lole y Manuel" flamenco music.

Dime by Lole y Manuel (from the movie "El amor brujo" by Carlos Saura)

Spanish Language exercises/ Ejercicios de Lengua Española. Un perro andaluz.

2010-11-19T01:54:00.009+02:00

Exercise/Ejercicio: El perro andaluz (1929) de Luís Buñuel y Salvador Dalí.

Un perro andaluz movie

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The shortmovie/ El cortometraje: El perro andaluz.

Spanish Language exercises/ Ejercicios de Lengua Española

2010-11-18T22:39:00.009+02:00

The exercise/ El ejercicio:
La negra tomasa ejercicio y cancion

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The video with the song "La Negra Tomasa":

VDU Uzsieniu Kalbu Centras- Ispanu Kalba

2010-09-04T10:18:00.003+03:00

Dear VDU students here you have the time-table of my lectures (VDU Uzsieniu Kalbu Centras).

Monday: from 8:00 -9:30 / 9:40-11:10 am (Levels 1 & 2)

Tuesday: from 8:00-9:30/ 9:40-11:10 am (Levels 1& 2)

Place: Gedimino, 44 (Faculty of Political Sciences). Room 302

Monday: from 16:00-17:30 pm (Level 3)

from 17:45-19:15 pm (Level 4)

Place: Donelaicio g. 60. Room 401

Friday: from 8:00-9:30 am (Level 3)

from 9:40-11:10 am (Level 4)

Place: Donelaicio g. 60. Room 401

Lectures will start on Monday 13th September. For more information and inscriptions please go to the Administration of UKC.

Gracias, Aciu!!!

Miquel

SMK MATHEMATICS SCHEDULE SPRING SEMESTER 2010

2010-05-26T23:12:00.002+03:00

Smk maths schedule spring semester 2010final

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Note: SMK Spring Semester 2010. Final Exam 10th JUNE.

The following sections have been dropped:

5.4. Unconstrained optimization
5.5. Constrained optimization
7.4. Input-output analysis

So you don't need to study them for the Final Exam.

Capitalism, a love story by Michael Moore

2010-05-26T22:23:00.007+03:00

Movie: “Capitalism: a love story” by Michael Moore (2009)
Answer the following questions:

a) Main ideas of the movie.
b) According to the film maker, Michael Moore, is democracy compatible with capitalism?
c) What does it mean “capitalism”? And “market economy”?
d) According to Michael Moore (and the priests that are interviewed at the movie) is compatible the message of Jesus Christ with the so-called “free market”?
e) According to Michael Moore, what did provoke the financial crisis of 2008?
f) Does Michael Moore think that there is a close relationship between the American military industry (that is the most important industry in United States) and the expansion of NATO? Do you agree with Michael Moore when he suggests that United States need the war to maintain their model of society and their model of economic growth?
g) Who was Franklin Delano Roosevelt? Why did he appear at the end of the movie of Moore?

SMK MACROECONOMICS SPRING SEMESTER 2010

2010-05-26T22:05:00.000+03:00

Smk macro schedule spring semester 2010 blog updated final

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Economics 2nd set of problems

2010-05-26T21:00:00.000+03:00

Economics 2nd set of problems

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Economics 1rst set of problems

2010-05-26T20:58:00.000+03:00

Economics 1 rst set of problems

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NORDPLUS INTENSIVE COURSE ON SUSTAINABLE TOURISM MANAGEMENT Lithuania/Lietuva April 12th-17th 2010 . The video.

2010-05-26T20:01:00.005+03:00

ONCE upon a time I got up in the morning and I found a sock in my pocket. I was somewhere in the Lithuanian coast, sorrounded by people that were speaking strange languages, and that liked drinking sangria and singing Spanish songs for children. Naive Spanish songs that were speaking about sardinas, gatos and zapatos.There was also a funny and cool volcano somewhere in Niceland. And 3 Mexicanos with sombreros, margaritas and tortillas.And we shared beautiful moments beside the castle of Trakai, cooking saslikas, drinking sangria and beers and taking sauna together.And it was like living a kind of Utopia lost in the Republic of Uzupis. Where everybody has the right to be happy.Still I have the sock in my pocket...and i think that tomorrow I will go to the job with the sock. Somehow the sock will remember me about all the people and the experiences we shared together. It was in Lithuania in the framework of the Nordic Tourism-Education Network. A course focused on sustainable tourism where teachers and students were living together in a pedagogical community. Sharing ideas, homework, puppets, slides, beers, assignments...and good feelings.Thank you all of you guys and see you some day... somehow ...somewhere.Nordic Tourism Education Network: Sustainable Tourism Management. Intensive Course. April 12th-17th, 2010. Vilnius-Trakai-Rumsiskes-Kaunas-Klaipeda-Nida. Lithuania. Thanks Tore for the video!

Nordic Course Vilnius April 2010

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DnBNord Bankas "Lithuanian Economic Outlook 2009"

2010-05-26T19:25:00.002+03:00

IN this post you will find the report of DnBNord Bankas “Lithuanian Economic Outlook 2009”.The students that want to improve their marks should prepare an essay. The following question can be the guide-line of your essays. Anyway you are allowed to include in your essays, topics that you consider interesting or important.

a) Analysis of the key macroeconomic indicators for Lithuania
b) Analysis of the inflation in Lithuania and in the other Baltic States
c) Foreign trade & Balance of Payments. What has happened with the exports and imports in Lithuania? What are the most important products and services that Lithuania is exporting? Who are the most important commercial partners of Lithuania?
d) What did happen with the investment in Lithuania?
e) Compare the economic situation in Lithuania with the other Baltic countries. What is the forecast of DnB Bankas for this new year 2010?
f) Conclusions

Use your own words. I expect no less than 5 pages (Times New Roman 12 points). The essay has to be hand it till the day of the dead-line (check the schedule of the your group). You should work individually and respect the policies about integrity and plagiarism included at the Syllabus that was distributed at the beginning of the course.

DnB Nord Bank report. Lithuania and Baltic countries

MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS. SET OF EXERCISES

2010-05-26T16:05:00.004+03:00

SMK-Vilnius Spring Semester 2010:

Mathematics for Economics and Business

The set of problems has to be hand in to the Lecturer by 15th of June by mail or in a hard copy to the Academic Department.

The set of problems if optional. You can get till 2 extra points that will be added to the mark obtained at the final exam.

Maths set of exercises spring 2010

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NORDPLUS INTENSIVE COURSE ON SUSTAINABLE TOURISM MANAGEMENT Lithuania/Lietuva April 12th-17th 2010

2010-04-05T22:27:00.003+03:00

Nordplus 2010 Info

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SMK MACROECONOMICS SPRING SEMESTER 2010

2010-03-14T14:52:00.005+02:00

SMK-Vilnius Branch

MACROECONOMICS Spring Semester 2010

First reading: "The great depression and world crisis" by Jawaharlal Nerhu

After reading the letters 184 “The great depression and world crisis” and 185 “What caused the crisis” ( included at the book Glimpses of world history wrote by Jawaharlal Nerhu, first President of the independent India) answer the following questions:

a) When the crisis of 1929 did start? What were their main causes?

b) In the letter 184 Nerhu says : “Society has learnt how to produce but not how to distribute what it has produced”. Do you think that society has improved in this issue since the time when Nerhu wrote this sentence?

c) What happened with the international trade ?

d) Do you think that there are similarities between the big depression in 1929 and the “recession” that started on 2008? And differences? Explain.

The homework has to be hand in on THURSDAY 18TH MARCH 2010. I left some copies of the readings in the College’s Secretary.

More information about life and works of Nehru you will find here

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru

Copenhagen Summit for dummies

2010-01-08T15:06:00.008+02:00

COPENHAGEN summit 2009 in just 38 seconds ; )
For more videos visit this website:
http://storyofcapandtrade.org
Enjoy!
MP

Schedule of Business Economics ISLB Fall semester 2009

2009-12-20T16:20:00.003+02:00

Final Schedule ( Business Economics ISLB. Fall semester 2009).

13 January 2010-Dead Line: Homework (essays, readings and problems sets ) will be accepted till next Wednesday13th. Hand in your homework at the International Department of ISLB (don’t forget to include your name and as well my name in the envelop).

In this post you will find the report of DnBNord Bankas “Lithuanian Economic Outlook 2009”.The students that want to improve their marks should prepare an essay. The following question can be the guide-line of your essays. Anyway you are allowed to include in your essays topics that you consider interesting or important.

a) Analysis of the key macroeconomic indicators for Lithuania
b) Analysis of the inflation in Lithuania and in the other Baltic States
c) Foreign trade & Balance of Payments. What has happened with the exports and imports in Lithuania? What are the most important products and services that Lithuania is exporting? Who are the most important commercial partners of Lithuania?
d) What did happen with the investment in Lithuania?
e) Compare the economic situation in Lithuania with the other Baltic countries. What is the forecast of DnB Bankas for this new year 2010?
f) Conclusions

Use your own words. I expect no less than 5 pages (Times New Roman 12 points).The students Ugur Ozen, Kowalski K., and Essen D. have to do the essay. It is compulsory for them!!!! For the rest of students it is optional. This essay substitutes the third set of problems that it was announced in my last communication.

18 January (Monday) : I will send you the list with the students that have to take the final exam again.

26 January (Tuesday): Final exam. The students included in the list will have to take the Final Exam again. The students that want to improve their mark are also welcome.

28 January (Thursday): Final evaluation (marks)

I wish you the best for this new year 2010

MP

DnB Nord Bank report. Lithuania and Baltic countries

International School of Business and Economics. Schedule updated

2009-12-16T12:07:00.003+02:00

ISLB SCHEDULE & INFORMATION DECEMBER 2009

First set of problems

2009-12-08T12:52:00.004+02:00

Hand in the following exercises:

Students of SMK Micro:
Exercises: 1,2,3,4,5,6,10
Dead Line: 15 DEC 2009 (Tuesday)

Students of SMK Macro:
Exercises: 2,7,8,9,10,11
Dead Line: 17 DEC 2009 (Thursday)

Students of ISLB (ex-VTVK):
Exercises: 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,10.
Dead Line: 17 DEC 2009 (Thursday)

Economics 1rst Set of Problems

Second set of problems

2009-12-03T01:19:00.006+02:00

Second set of problems

Hand in the following exercises:

Students of SMK Micro:
Exercises: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,15,16,17 (choose only 6)
Dead Line: The day of the final exam 2009 (15 December 2009)

Students SMK Macro:
Exercises:. 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,18,19,20 (choose only 8)
Dead Line: The day of the final exam (17 December 2009)

Students of ISLB:
Exercises: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,13,14,15,16,17 (choose only 8).
Dead Line: The day of the final exam (17 December 2009)

Economics 2nd Set of Problems

The Jobs Imperative

2009-11-30T21:41:00.004+02:00

IF you’re looking for a job right now, your prospects are terrible. There are six times as many Americans seeking work as there are job openings, and the average duration of unemployment — the time the average job-seeker has spent looking for work — is more than six months, the highest level since the 1930s.

You might think, then, that doing something about the employment situation would be a top policy priority. But now that total financial collapse has been averted, all the urgency seems to have vanished from policy discussion, replaced by a strange passivity. There’s a pervasive sense in Washington that nothing more can or should be done, that we should just wait for the economic recovery to trickle down to workers.This is wrong and unacceptable.

Yes, the recession is probably over in a technical sense, but that doesn’t mean that full employment is just around the corner. Historically, financial crises have typically been followed not just by severe recessions but by anemic recoveries; it’s usually years before unemployment declines to anything like normal levels. And all indications are that the aftermath of the latest financial crisis is following the usual script. The Federal Reserve, for example, expects unemployment, currently 10.2 percent, to stay above 8 percent — a number that would have been considered disastrous not long ago — until sometime in 2012.

And the damage from sustained high unemployment will last much longer. The long-term unemployed can lose their skills, and even when the economy recovers they tend to have difficulty finding a job, because they’re regarded as poor risks by potential employers. Meanwhile, students who graduate into a poor labor market start their careers at a huge disadvantage — and pay a price in lower earnings for their whole working lives. Failure to act on unemployment isn’t just cruel, it’s short-sighted. So it’s time for an emergency jobs program.

How is a jobs program different from a second stimulus? It’s a matter of priorities. The 2009 Obama stimulus bill was focused on restoring economic growth. It was, in effect, based on the belief that if you build G.D.P., the jobs will come. That strategy might have worked if the stimulus had been big enough — but it wasn’t. And as a matter of political reality, it’s hard to see how the administration could pass a second stimulus big enough to make up for the original shortfall.

So our best hope now is for a somewhat cheaper program that generates more jobs for the buck. Such a program should shy away from measures, like general tax cuts, that at best lead only indirectly to job creation, with many possible disconnects along the way. Instead, it should consist of measures that more or less directly save or add jobs.

One such measure would be another round of aid to beleaguered state and local governments, which have seen their tax receipts plunge and which, unlike the federal government, can’t borrow to cover a temporary shortfall. More aid would help avoid both a drastic worsening of public services (especially education) and the elimination of hundreds of thousands of jobs.

Meanwhile, the federal government could provide jobs by ... providing jobs. It’s time for at least a small-scale version of the New Deal’s Works Progress Administration, one that would offer relatively low-paying (but much better than nothing) public-service employment. There would be accusations that the government was creating make-work jobs, but the W.P.A. left many solid achievements in its wake. And the key point is that direct public employment can create a lot of jobs at relatively low cost. In a proposal to be released today, the Economic Policy Institute, a progressive think tank, argues that spending $40 billion a year for three years on public-service employment would create a million jobs, which sounds about right.

Finally, we can offer businesses direct incentives for employment. It’s probably too late for a job-conserving program, like the highly successful subsidy Germany offered to employers who maintained their work forces. But employers could be encouraged to add workers as the economy expands. The Economic Policy Institute proposes a tax credit for employers who increase their payrolls, which is certainly worth trying.

All of this would cost money, probably several hundred billion dollars, and raise the budget deficit in the short run. But this has to be weighed against the high cost of inaction in the face of a social and economic emergency.

Later this week, President Obama will hold a “jobs summit.” Most of the people I talk to are cynical about the event, and expect the administration to offer no more than symbolic gestures. But it doesn’t have to be that way. Yes, we can create more jobs — and yes, we should.

By PAUL KRUGMAN

Published: November 29, 2009

Ejercicios Beginners 2nd year, Ejercicio 2

2009-11-29T23:46:00.006+02:00

Ejercicios 2 Advanced

Pension and Mutual Funds in Lithuania. Conference. International School of Law and Business.

2009-11-27T21:11:00.004+02:00

Mr. Taurimas Valys, expert in Pension and Mutual Funds in Lithuania, with many years of experience in the sector, and Ph. D. Candidate in Vilnius Univerity, gave a seminar in my classroom. After the lecture a questionnaire was distributed among the students. I want to thank you for the attendance. It will be rewarded in the final evaluation.

M.P

Pension and Mutual Funds in Lithuania. Seminar 09 11 25

2009-11-27T21:02:00.001+02:00

SMK Macroeconomics Final Exam Information & Schedule November December 2009

Cost the production, economies of scale and marginal analysis

2009-11-27T20:41:00.005+02:00

Production Inputs and Cost Supply Analysis

SMK MICROECONOMICS SCHEDULE & FINAL EXAM

2009-11-27T20:29:00.004+02:00

SMK_MICROECONOMICS SCHEDULE & FINAL EXAM

2009-11-27T20:29:00.003+02:00

Economies of Scale

2009-11-27T20:00:00.000+02:00

Economies of Scale

2009-11-27T19:58:00.001+02:00

VTVKinformationschedulenovember2009blog

The American Betrayal of the World's Rural Poor

2009-11-24T12:39:00.002+02:00

SINCE the late 1980's, there are any number of examples one could choose to symbolize the dramatic failure of the U.S. and its allies to deliver on their utopian promises for market-driven higher living standards in the developing world. Among them are the worse crisis since the Great Depression, increasing economic inequality, destruction of the environment, and rapid declines in several key measures of welfare. However, the stunning lack of progress made in the lives of the rural poor should go down in history as one of the great betrayals of the neoliberal era.

For decades international financial institutions, aid organizations and the United Nations advocated an aid based approach to fighting world hunger. The way to respond, the hungry were told to believe, was through a series of technological 'green revolutions', increased market access and external support. At the same time international financial institutions were shoving their ideology of deregulation and liberalization down the throats of national governments. The result? The number of hungry people has topped one billion for the first time since records were established in 1970. Instead of placing blame on a failed strategy, the aid community is blaming the global recession and food crisis for their inability to eradicate hunger.

In the run-up to the 2009 UN Food Summit, the international aid community announced the boldest betrayal of hundreds of millions of starving people around the world. The UN Food Summit also backed away from any recommitment to halve world hunger by 2015---a key component of the UN Millenium Development Goals. Now the experts are claiming that even that goal may be impossible to reach until mid-2040. Humanitarian groups have rightly protested that the Rome summit was a failure, and that the three-day event was damaged by the absence of many of the world's leaders. The only silver-lining of the summit is perhaps the long overdue rejection of neoliberal paradigms in the final agreement. National responsibility for food security is one of the core principles in the summit declaration, which demands that plans for food security must be “nationally articulated, designed, owned and led.”

"The responsibility for ensuring food security, agricultural and rural development is the responsibility of each government and its people...It’s not the responsibility of the FAO and certainly not the responsibility of a summit. A summit does not have land. A summit does not have farmers. A summit does not have a budget to invest. A summit is a framework for discussion and debate to arrive at consensus solutions in the face of common challenges at the global level.”

In the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, American leaders boasted that the global integration of investment, trade, and communication would lead to a diffusion of economic prosperity and human development around the world. In 2009, with all of the enormous global prosperity, free trade, and cutting-edge technology the fact that there are more hungry people now than a decade ago, should make us re-think our basic laissez-faire assumptions about economic development. The prominent libertarian economist Friedrich von Hayek once warned that the social democratic welfare state of the post 1930's New Deal era would lead down the 'Road to Serfdom'. But in fact it is Hayek and the development policy-makers who shared his ideas who have condemned the rural poor to virtual slavery.

By E. Thomson

Conference mutual and pensions funds in Lithuania

2009-11-23T01:02:00.002+02:00

Taurimas Conference

2009-11-22T23:02:00.003+02:00

Spanish for Beginners Ejercicios 1

Ejercicios Beginners 2nd year, Ejercicio 1

2009-11-22T22:58:00.005+02:00

Ejercicios 1. Estudiantes avanzados.

Spanish Advanced Ejercicio 1

First set of problems

2009-11-09T00:18:00.003+02:00

Hand in the following exercises:

Students of SMK Micro:
Exercises: 1,2,3,4,5,6,10
Dead Line: 8 DEC 2009 (Tuesday)

Students of SMK Macro:
Exercises: 2,7,8,9,10,11
Dead Line: 10 DEC 2009 (Thursday)

Students of ISLB (ex-VTVK):
Exercises: 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,10.
Dead Line: 10 DEC 2009 (Thursday)

Economics 1rst Set of Problemsbueno

Taking out the trash

2009-11-04T00:12:00.009+02:00

I reproduce a post written by G. Mankiw at his blog. It's quite clear that Mankiw and Krugman are not friends any more. The post was published on November 02 2009.

http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/11/taking-out-trash.html

The Obama administration’s “jobs created or saved” is just a way of saying “other things equal” in non-economese. Of course it makes sense to ask how many more people are working than would have been the case without a given policy — and every administration makes assertions along those lines. During the 2001 recession and its aftermath, how many times did the Bush administration claim that the recession would have been worse without its tax cuts? And while many of us quarreled with that claim, I don’t think I ever argued that other-things-equal arguments are nonsense on their face.

I don't usually respond to illogical cheap shots from around the blogosphere (life is too short). But when the cheap shot comes from a Nobel prize winner in economics, I will make an exception.

Paul Krugman says I should be ashamed of myself for calling into question Obama administration estimates of how many jobs have been "created or saved." Here is what Paul says,
Yet Paul is rebutting claims I did not make, and he is giving Team Obama more credit on this question than it is due. Here is what I wrote on the topic last February:

The 4 million job number is a counterfactual policy simulation of what the stimulus will do based on a particular model of the economy. As such, I have no objection to someone citing it in a policy discussion. In fact, macroeconomists use models to generate figures like this all the time. I have even done it myself.

But as an answer to the question "how can the American people gauge whether or not your programs are working?... What metric should they use?", citing the 4 million job figure is a non sequitur, or more likely a diversion. A metric has to be measurable, and the actual number of jobs "created or saved" by the policy will never be measurable from any data source.

That is, I do not object to claims such as,

A: "Based on our models of the economy, we believe there would be X million fewer jobs today without the stimulus."But it is absurd to suggest that you can say,

B: "We have measured how many jobs the stimulus has saved or created, and the number is X."Economists are capable of making statements such as A, but it is beyond our ken to make statements such as B. Statement B is,of course, much stronger than statement A, as it purports to be based on data rather than on models. Unfortunately, we are hearing statements like B much too often from administration officials. A good example is here, where can you "learn" that 110,185.36 jobs have been created or saved in California alone."

2009-10-26T15:52:00.000+02:00

Invitation to the Students' Conference

2009-10-22T15:12:00.002+03:00

MankiwReal Business Cycles

An example of in class presentation

2009-10-22T14:59:00.005+03:00

AN example of good in class presentation. Moreover I remind you that together the slides you have to prepare an essay following the instructions given in my lectures.

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN EUROPE AND THE USmodi

The financial crisis according to South Park

2009-10-22T14:39:00.001+03:00

Principles of economics by Greg Mankiw. Creative proposal by his students of Harvard

2009-10-18T23:17:00.002+03:00

Supply and Demand

2009-10-01T17:45:00.003+03:00

BE SEP09 Supply Demand

2009-09-23T23:44:00.004+03:00

PKarticle

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html

Economic Donkeys

2009-09-13T20:56:00.005+03:00

EARLY in the First World War, British generals decided to attack German trenches with an initial light bombardment, followed by infantry walking in close order across No Man’s Land. The result was tens of thousands killed in a series of military disasters, but the generals reacted with only small adjustments to their approach and essentially persisted in repeating the same mistakes for years. “The English soldiers fight like lions,” one German general remarked. “True. But don’t we know that they are lions led by donkeys?” was the reply.

Today, a year after global financial collapse and the ensuing tragedy for millions, our economic leaders are lining us up to suffer again (and again) through the same horrible experiences.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 demonstrated just how far our economic system in general and bank management in particular have gone awry. Lehman borrowed at low interest rates in global credit markets, and invested over half a trillion dollars of other people’s money in assets which, today, are worth next-to-nothing: failed ski hills in Montana, now empty suburban housing in California, and crazy bets on derivatives (options to buy or sell securities, in various complex combinations).

Worries about these failed investments sparked a run on the bank. And, after a mad weekend of trying to save Lehman, the U.S. “authorities” – meaning Henry Paulson (Secretary of the Treasury), Ben Bernanke (chairman of the Federal Reserve Board), and Timothy Geithner (President of the New York Fed) – decided to let it go bankrupt. Creditors, realizing no major bank is safe if our leaders might now let them fail, pulled cash from major financial institutions and bought relatively safe US Treasuries and UK Gilts.

Today Lehman’s senior debt trades at a mere 10 cents on the dollar, suggesting its $600 billion in assets were a mirage. This outcome is even more startling when compared to senior debt at Kazakhstan’s defaulting large banks, where management is now accused of serious malfeasance, yet that debt trades at 20 cents on the dollar – twice the price of Lehman’s debt.

At the G20 meeting of finance ministers last week, political leaders united behind two key steps which they claim will “prevent another Lehman”: tighter controls on the pay of executives and more capital for banks. France and Germany blame the crisis on lax regulation in Anglo-Saxon markets and excessive pay packets that encourage irresponsible risk taking. The British and Americans counter that European banks have too much debt (i.e., in the jargon, are “overly leveraged”), and need to raise more capital. The final communiqué proposes to do both, and we will hear more of the same at the upcoming G20 heads of government summit in Pittsburgh. But, in reality, both sides want only minor adjustments that cannot solve the real problems posed by our financial system.

Tim Geithner, now US Treasury Secretary, is pushing for higher capital requirements for banks, i.e., they need to have more shareholder funds to protect against future losses. But he surely knows that two weeks prior to its bankruptcy, Lehman’s management reported they were well-capitalized, with a tier one capital ratio of 11% — roughly twice what the United States currently considers is needed for a well-capitalized bank, and much higher than the American side is proposing in private conversations.

Christine Lagarde, France’s Finance Minister, and Angela Merkel, President of Germany, helped convince the G20 that bank compensation policies need to be amended to encourage long term incentives. They want compensation packages to be limited and bonuses to be locked up, so we can be sure employees’ incentives are consistent with the long term survival of their banks.

President Merkel and Minister Lagarde need to look no further than Lehman for a model of how to introduce a good policy to align incentives. The top management and many employees in the company were largely compensated in shares of the company which vested over many years, so when Lehman Brothers went down, it brought crashing down the lives and finances of its 20,000 employees. Dick Fuld, the highly compensated head of Lehman, lost many million dollars – and presumably a large part of his total wealth. Apart from criminal penalties (of the kind not seen for banking in a century), can we think of a better way of aligning incentives with the outcomes for a bank?

The real problem with our financial system is that our economic and political system work together to encourage excessive risk, and this risk in turn leads to cycles of prosperity and collapse. In 1998, a much smaller Lehman Brothers was placed in financial peril by the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and failure of Long Term Capital Management, a major hedge fund. The Federal Reserve responded by lowering interest rates and other central banks followed suit. This reduced the cost of obtaining funds, effectively bailing out Lehman and other institutions in trouble.

As markets have grown to recognize how quick the Federal Reserve is to bail out institutions (and executives) in trouble, they naturally respond. In the 1990s, people talked about the “Greenspan Put” a term which derisively suggests that it is always safe to invest in risky assets, because the Federal Reserve is ready to bail out investors (a put is effectively a promise to buy an asset at a fixed price if you are unable to sell it to someone else at a higher price – this is a way to lock-in profits or limit losses on investments). However, in months following the collapse of Lehman, we learned that the “Bernanke Put” is even more valuable since Chairman Bernanke, alongside the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and central banks in much of the rest of the world, is prepared to take drastic measures to prevent asset prices from falling when there are risks of global collapse.

This policy of responding to the aftermath of bubbles, rather than addressing them before they get going, through tighter regulation, has become the mantra of most central banks. It is usually combined with fiscal policy stimulus and other measures to support the economy. Each time banks fail, by bailing the system out again, we teach our finance sector a lesson: you can safely take too much risk because, when you lose, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. We also send a simple message to creditors: it is safe to lend to Goldman Sachs, or Barclays Bank, because taxpayers and our nations’ savers are standing by to cover your losses. Rational bank executives and creditors respond as any person would: creditors lend to banks at low interest rates, and our banks gamble heavily hoping to make large profits. Such a system is destined to fail, but the party can run for a long time.

While Ben Bernanke has done a wonderful job of preventing financial meltdown, his calls in 2002-2003 for very low interest rates, without fixing our financial system, contributed to the credit expansion that led us into the current mess. In the United Kingdom, the Conservatives plan to transfer regulatory powers to the Bank of England, despite the fact that, like the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England has been a key component of our ever growing cycles of credit expansion and bust.

The “collapse or rescue” decision forced by Lehman’s failure is a symptom of a much larger systemic problem. We need leaders, both in the financial world and in public service who recognize that our financial sector too often causes social harm. There is no doubt that it also provides valuable services that are vital to the well-being of our pensioners and savers, and help manage and mitigate risk for our corporations. Yet too often these activities cause losses, which, either directly or indirectly, become a burden on the rest of society.

The pre-crisis activities and portfolios of Barclays, Goldman Sachs, and other “survivors” of this crisis were only slightly different from Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, which failed. The “good” banks also securitized subprime assets, helped build the intricate web of IOUs between banks and insurance companies, and leveraged their balance sheets to enormous levels. The winners were not better, they were just smart enough to make sure someone else held the bad assets when the music stopped, and they were powerful enough to win generous bailout packages from their governments.

The danger we face is that, by bailing out these institutions and rewarding failed managers with new powerful positions, we have now created a much more dangerous financial system. The politically well-connected, knowing they will most likely do fine in the next crisis, is now highly incentivized to take even greater risk.

Once we admit this profound problem in our system, we can begin to think of the radical measures needed to solve it. There is no doubt these solutions will include much greater capital requirements, so that bank shareholders know that they face substantial losses if their ventures fail.

But, we also need to ensure that our regulators are not captured by the banks that they are meant to oversee. This means we need to put checks on financial donations to political parties, and we need to buttress our regulators with more intellectual firepower and financial resources, along with rules that ensure independence, in order to be sure they can act in the interests of the broader population.

We also need to close the revolving door, through which politicians and regulators leave office to earn their nest eggs in finance, and “financial experts” move directly from failing banks to designing bailout packages. The conflicts of interest are abundant and most dangerous.

Last week the UK’s chief financial regulator, Adair Turner, faced heavy criticism from the City, Chancellor Darling, Boris Johnson, and editorials in the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. His main offense was daring to raise the issue of whether parts of our financial system have become socially dysfunctional, in an interview with Prospect Magazine. He called for greater capital requirements at banks, and he pondered how it would be possible for regulators to preserve the valuable parts of our financial system, while ensuring that regulation limited the harmful parts. These are eminently sensible questions which anyone with a public spirit should understand are critical policy issues today.

Sadly, these public rebukes to Lord Turner are a further indication that very few of our leaders are prepared to even discuss the real problem, let alone seek a sufficient solution. Smart people and well-organized governments can, as in the past, behave like donkeys.

By Peter Boone and Simon Johnson in the blog "The Baseline Scenario"

An edited and shorter version of this post appeared today in the Sunday Times (of London).

VTVK, Business Economics, Fall semester 2009, 3rd slides september 2009

2009-09-06T17:21:00.003+03:00

VTVK BE Sep 09 Interdependence_para El Blog

VTVK, Business Economics, Fall semester 2009, 2nd slides september 2009

2009-09-06T17:12:00.005+03:00

VTVKBE Sep Thinking as Economist Para El Blog

VTVK, Business Economics, Fall semester 2009, 1rst slides september 2009

2009-09-06T16:54:00.005+03:00

VTVK BE SEP09tenpricinciples_para El Blog

VTVK, Business Economics, Fall semester 2009, 1rst reading

2009-09-06T16:46:00.005+03:00

VTVK Fall 2009 Be 1readingVARIAN What Use Theory 8911

US Health Care in Comparison

2009-07-30T19:39:00.005+03:00

COMMENTATORS much more capable than myself are weighing in on the important health care debate taking place in Washington D.C. However, given the historic magnitude of the Obama Administration's push for health care reform I have decided to diverge from my usual focus to humbly remind my readers exactly why the American system needs fixing. Let's put it in perspective.

According to the OECD Health Data 2009 the United States' performance is comparatively lacking on all fronts. The OECD is comprised of the world's wealthiest nations with the highest living standards. Unfortunately, for citizens of the United States, our system spends much more and covers less people.

Spending More

"Total health spending accounted for 16.0% of GDP in the United States in 2007, by far the highest share in the OECD. Following the United States were France, Switzerland and Germany, which allocated respectively 11.0%, 10.8% and 10.4% of their GDP to health. The OECD average was 8.9% in 2007."

Covering Less

"For this amount of expenditure in the United States, government provides insurance coverage only for the elderly and disabled (through Medicare, which primarily insures persons aged 65 and over and people with disabilities) and some of the poor (through Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, SCHIP), whereas in most other OECD countries this is enough for government to provide universal primary health insurance."

The United States has fewer doctors per-capita than any other OECD country. We also lag behind world leaders in increasing life expectancy and declining infant mortality rates. This is all despite being the world's wealthiest country. The reason? Unlike most other industrialized OECD nations, the US does not have a universal health care system. Even the current reforms being advocated by President Obama fall short of providing universal quality care for every American. Furthermore, the administration left the single-payer option off the table which would have been the most efficient cost cutting mechanism. As a country that prides its self on being the "best" in the world, health care should offer every American a powerful dose humility.

What went wrong with economics and how the discipline should change to avoid the mistakes of the past

2009-07-30T14:55:00.000+03:00

OF ALL the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have burst more spectacularly than the reputation of economics itself. A few years ago, the dismal science was being acclaimed as a way of explaining ever more forms of human behaviour, from drug-dealing to sumo-wrestling. Wall Street ransacked the best universities for game theorists and options modellers. And on the public stage, economists were seen as far more trustworthy than politicians. John McCain joked that Alan Greenspan, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, was so indispensable that if he died, the president should “prop him up and put a pair of dark glasses on him.”

In the wake of the biggest economic calamity in 80 years that reputation has taken a beating. In the public mind an arrogant profession has been humbled. Though economists are still at the centre of the policy debate—think of Ben Bernanke or Larry Summers in America or Mervyn King in Britain—their pronouncements are viewed with more scepticism than before. The profession itself is suffering from guilt and rancour. In a recent lecture, Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel prize in economics in 2008, argued that much of the past 30 years of macroeconomics was “spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at worst.” Barry Eichengreen, a prominent American economic historian, says the crisis has “cast into doubt much of what we thought we knew about economics.”

In its crudest form—the idea that economics as a whole is discredited—the current backlash has gone far too far. If ignorance allowed investors and politicians to exaggerate the virtues of economics, it now blinds them to its benefits. Economics is less a slavish creed than a prism through which to understand the world. It is a broad canon, stretching from theories to explain how prices are determined to how economies grow. Much of that body of knowledge has no link to the financial crisis and remains as useful as ever.

And if economics as a broad discipline deserves a robust defence, so does the free-market paradigm. Too many people, especially in Europe, equate mistakes made by economists with a failure of economic liberalism. Their logic seems to be that if economists got things wrong, then politicians will do better. That is a false—and dangerous—conclusion.

Rational fools

These important caveats, however, should not obscure the fact that two central parts of the discipline—macroeconomics and financial economics—are now, rightly, being severely re-examined. There are three main critiques: that macro and financial economists helped cause the crisis, that they failed to spot it, and that they have no idea how to fix it.

The first charge is half right. Macroeconomists, especially within central banks, were too fixated on taming inflation and too cavalier about asset bubbles. Financial economists, meanwhile, formalised theories of theefficiency of markets, fuelling the notion that markets would regulate themselves and financial innovation was always beneficial. Wall Street’s most esoteric instruments were built on these ideas.

But economists were hardly naive believers in market efficiency. Financial academics have spent much of the past 30 years poking holes in the “efficient market hypothesis”. A recent ranking of academic economists was topped by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrei Shleifer, two prominent hole-pokers. A newly prominent field, behavioural economics, concentrates on the consequences of irrational actions.

So there were caveats aplenty. But as insights from academia arrived in the rough and tumble of Wall Street, such delicacies were put aside. And absurd assumptions were added. No economic theory suggests you should value mortgage derivatives on the basis that house prices would always rise. Finance professors are not to blame for this, but they might have shouted more loudly that their insights were being misused. Instead many cheered the party along (often from within banks). Put that together with the complacency of the macroeconomists and there were too few voices shouting stop.

Blindsided and divided

The charge that most economists failed to see the crisis coming also has merit. To be sure, some warned of trouble. The likes of Robert Shiller of Yale, Nouriel Roubini of New York University and the team at the Bank for International Settlements are now famous for their prescience. But most were blindsided. And even worrywarts who felt something was amiss had no idea of how bad the consequences would be.

That was partly to do with professional silos, which limited both the tools available and the imaginations of the practitioners. Few financial economists thought much about illiquidity or counterparty risk, for instance, because their standard models ignore it; and few worried about the effect on the overall economy of the markets for all asset classes seizing up simultaneously, since few believed that was possible.

Macroeconomists also had a blindspot: their standard models assumed that capital markets work perfectly. Their framework reflected an uneasy truce between the intellectual heirs of Keynes, who accept that economies can fall short of their potential, and purists who hold that supply must always equal demand. The models that epitomise this synthesis—the sort used in many central banks—incorporate imperfections in labour markets (“sticky” wages, for instance, which allow unemployment to rise), but make no room for such blemishes in finance. By assuming that capital markets worked perfectly, macroeconomists were largely able to ignore the economy’s financial plumbing. But models that ignored finance had little chance of spotting a calamity that stemmed from it.

What about trying to fix it? Here the financial crisis has blown apart the fragile consensus between purists and Keynesians that monetary policy was the best way to smooth the business cycle. In many countries short-term interest rates are near zero and in a banking crisis monetary policy works less well. With their compromise tool useless, both sides have retreated to their roots, ignoring the other camp’s ideas. Keynesians, such as Mr Krugman, have become uncritical supporters of fiscal stimulus. Purists are vocal opponents. To outsiders, the cacophony underlines the profession’s uselessness.

Add these criticisms together and there is a clear case for reinvention, especially in macroeconomics. Just as the Depression spawned Keynesianism, and the 1970s stagflation fuelled a backlash, creative destruction is already under way. Central banks are busy bolting crude analyses of financial markets onto their workhorse models. Financial economists are studying the way that incentives can skew market efficiency. And today’s dilemmas are prompting new research: which form of fiscal stimulus is most effective? How do you best loosen monetary policy when interest rates are at zero? And so on.

But a broader change in mindset is still needed. Economists need to reach out from their specialised silos: macroeconomists must understand finance, and finance professors need to think harder about the context within which markets work. And everybody needs to work harder on understanding asset bubbles and what happens when they burst. For in the end economists are social scientists, trying to understand the real world. And the financial crisis has changed that world.

From The Economist print edition, July 16th 2009

Traditional Chicago Economics Under Pressure: Beyond The Thaler-Posner Debate

2009-07-30T14:28:00.002+03:00

RICHARD Posner is against the proposed new Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA). This is, of course, not a surprise. Posner has always been an articulate advocate of the view most often associated with economics at the University of Chicago: market-based outcomes are invariably better than the alternatives, and anything that interferes with consumer choice is a bad idea.

Posner wraps this opposition to the CFPA into an odd attack (near the end of his WSJ op ed)Thaler here.) on the personal decision-making abilities of Richard Thaler – a leading economist on consumer choice, misperceptions, and mistakes. (More on

Thaler, also of the University of Chicago, hit back hard yesterday. He is right that Posner mischaracterizes the CFPA proposal, and points out that his agenda – and that of Cass Sunstein, formerly of Chicago and now a czar in the adminstration – is simply to provide consumers with a framework for better decisions. He implies that Posner defends defective baby cribs and their equivalent.

I would go further.

Think of it this way. We’ve learned a great deal about how consumers make decisions, including when they get things right and wrong. Behavioral economics, marketing, and related social science have made big strides (e.g., follow the work of Dan Ariely).

But all of this research is also available to companies. Perhaps they knew some of this before from trial-and-error, but there is no question that many of the techniques corporate America uses – and we as consumers find ourselves “up against” – is cutting edge manipulation of our decisions.

We worry a great deal about how corporations lobby to shape their regulatory environment. This is a struggle that is at least 150 years old in its modern form (e.g., railroad concessions), and much older if we think about powerful people bribing their way into advantageous relationships with the state.

In addition, companies now have powerful new tools to shape how we perceive our potential choices. Some of these tools might be good for us also – I’m open to argument on this. But within some particular spaces, including financial products, it’s clear that many of these “innovations” are actually clever ways to extract value from consumers.

Traditional Chicago economics always had its weaknesses – particularly when you focus on the fact that the “rules of the game” are often shaped by the more powerful. Thaler and Sunstein (and others) are trying to modernize this view more generally, while keeping the element of consumer choice as central.

But if the balance of power has shifted – due to technological innovation in social science – further towards corporations and away from consumers, then the task ahead is much harder.

Unless companies are compelled to keep their offerings “simple enough to understand”, we will face repeated rip-offs and crises – both macroeconomic and personal – arising from our financial sector.

By Simon Johnson at The Baseline Scenario